China’s diplomatic multilateralism – 反思中国多边主义外交 – English

100%
22 paragraph translated (22 in total)
Read or translate in

You are viewing an old revision of this post, from June 10, 2015 @ 03:45:24. See below for differences between this version and the current revision.

So far, China’s diplomatic multilateralism has deeply changed. To make it simple, one can divide the changing process in three stages.

The first one is the Mao era when China opposed and fought against diplomatic multilateralism, advocating, instead, bilateralism. At that time China closely guarded the concept of national sovereignity, often considering diplomatic multilateralism as a way to interfere in other states’affairs. The second stage is the aftermath of the Reform and Opening policy,when China’s approach to diplomatic multilateralism was fairly passive:according to needs, People’s Republic joined diplomatic multilateralism guided by other states.This balance of power has deeply influenced China’s foreign affairs.In this period China joined a lot of regional and international multilateral organizations. Starting from the end of 90s the country entered a new stage, actively building a multilateral diplomatic system. Being at the beginning a capital-poor country, it gradually become a country with a capital surplus, wanting to “go out” and cooperate with the other countries. The China-ASEAN free trade area is a clear example. Following its abruptly rise, in addition to the satisfaction of its safety needs, China must also undertake more responsabilities in the regional and international fields. For this reason the county must actively establish a multilateral organizations’ system. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks are two models:the first aims at fighting fear and creating economic cooperation, the second at solving the Corean peninsula question.

Today, China’s diplomatic multilateralism is in a new stage. With a Gross National Income (GNI) of more than 10 trillions USdollars, the country is the second biggest economic system in the world. Even if the GDP per capita is still low, China’s internal changes will have a great external influence. At the same time China speeded up the “Going Out” policy, not only in the economic field, but also in diplomacy and strategy.The People’s Republic and the other BRIC countries founded the BRIC bank; following the Silk Road Strategy, China advocated and established the “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” and created Silk Road Fund. I am convinced that from now on China will establish more regional economic organizations and also greater scale, supraregional, international organizations. Despite China’s key role in the process of setting up such organizations, their actions are decided by the regional and internatinal members. As a big, rising nation the People’s Republic cant’t avoid this trend because its sustainable development and its regional and international responsabilities are at stake.

Diplomatic multilateralism is an efficacious way for China’s rise but the country must have a clear consciousness of its status in the diplomatic multilateralism frame. China has experienced diplomatic multilateralism for years so can learn a lesson from the past

Generally speaking, China’s multilateralism, no matter if the approach is passive or active, has some unique traits. First, China’s multilateralism neither challenged the existing order nor established a regional order accepted by other countries. Second, even if we cant’s say that the multilateral organizations set up by China are not useful, they are not as effective as one can expect. 第三,对相关国家来说,中国所确立的多边组织发生了一些作用,但对自己的国家的发展也并非那么相关。

成效不彰的原因

为什么会出现这些特征?可以从以往的实践中得到哪些经验教训呢?至少可以如下几个方面来看。

首先是缺失有效的话语权。正如内部改革实践,中国的外部开放也少有话语权,就是说,中国总是解释不了自己的实践。很多方面的外交,尤其是比较重要的外交实践,高层领导一定调子,就不能出现其他的话语了。这是中国制度的制约所致。最显著的例子就是中国正在推行的“丝绸之路”。国家主席习近平访问中亚国家和印度尼西亚时,就丝绸之路讲了几个重点。这非常重要。但随后中国几乎所有的智库,都在论证这些要点的重要性,好像除了这些要点,丝绸之路就没有其他的了。这种论证式的政策研究,很难确立起中国自身的话语权,机械地解释和解读,并不是有效的政策研究。实际上,这种解释和解读既不能丰富丝绸之路的内核和内容,更会使得其庸俗化。

其次,以运动的方式来推进外交。如同内政领域,中国的各级政府官僚,也总是喜欢用运动的方式来推进外交事业。最典型的例子就是孔子学院。孔子学院尽管是双边关系,但其背后的逻辑是一样的。从2004年11月全球第一所孔子学院在韩国成立,到2014年11月的10年时间里,中国已经在全球126个国家建立了475所孔子学院和851个孔子课程。这一发展不可说不迅速。但运动式的推进很难一个一个地加以巩固,必然会导致“回潮”。近年来,孔子学院就面临比较难堪的局面,因为一些西方大学开始不再续约办理孔子学院或者孔子课程。在很大程度上,现在正在推进的丝绸之路的情况也差不多,推进的方式给人的感觉也是运动式的。

运动式的推进方式就是经常在不了解他国的情况下,急于求成,采用一些让他国感觉到压力的方式来接受中国。这里,在中国的主观愿望和他国对中国的认知之间,存在着巨大的鸿沟。中国认为,这些项目都是有利于他国的,至少是有利于双方之间交往的,因此是良好的愿望。不过,他国并不经常这样看,他们总是经常从外交、政治、经济、国防安全等方面,综合地评价中国的项目,有时候并不认为中国的项目,是有利于他们的国家利益的。

再次,中国推行(多边)外交的政策知识储备远远不足,往往对运动式的推广方式推波助澜,最终造成“好心办坏事”的结局。以正在进行的“亚洲基础设施投资银行”来说,有关国家可以分为三个群体。第一个群体是既得利益者,也就是现在主导亚洲事务的国家,包括美国和日本等。可以理解,既得利益不喜欢、反对甚至抵制新的利益的出现。亚投行被视为对日本和美国所主导的亚银构成了竞争甚至挑战,来自这些国家的反对和抵制也就不难理解了。

第二个群体可以说是现实主义派,或者机会主义派,他们对中国主导的亚投行抱有怀疑态度,既不想放弃这个对他们有利的机会,但又对之抱有很大的不确定性。这个群体里,也包括那些深受美国影响的国家,例如韩国。韩国在经济方面和中国的整合性已经达到了非常高的程度,但战略上高度依赖美国,美国仍然能够轻易影响韩国的决策。第三个群体便是亚投行的支持者,大多数都是发展中甚至是落后国家,他们迫切希望通过丝绸之路建设来发展本身的经济。对这些国家应当实行不同的政策。

但因为对不同国家情况了解不够深入,不能有效地分析和判断它们可能的反应,中国方面往往使用“一刀切”的方式,不分情况,全面推广。不难理解,这个过程中必然会遇到强大的阻力。

强化政策知识储备

更严重的是,决策者和政策研究者对有关国家内部的政治力量分布没有足够的认识,往往造成重要的决策失误。经常的情况是,有很多国家尽管还不是民主,政权仍然具有权威主义性质,但反对力量以不同方式存在着。这些国家内部的不同政治力量,对周边的大国又抱有不同甚至截然相反的态度和政策,例如一些亲华,一些反华。同时,正如中国,其他大国也在努力影响着这些国家。因为没有足够的政策知识储备,中国方面在没有考虑到反对力量的情况下,往往和现存的、亲华的政治力量达成诸多协议(包括投资贸易和基础设施建设等)。一旦现任领导被选下去或者因为其他情况下台时,中国就没有任何机制来保障自己的权益。几年前,中国在缅甸的项目就遇到这种情况,近来在斯里兰卡也面临类似的不确定性。

因为中国的多边主义外交实践仍然处于早期阶段,交些学费也属正常。不过,中国可以少交学费,因为中国的外交行为仍然有巨大的改进空间,通过努力可以最大程度地避免上述这些情况。

首先是要重视话语权的建设。在主权国家时代,各国都具有强烈的主权意识,缺乏有效的话语权,无论是双边外交还是多边外交,中国“走出去”就会困难重重。作为软力量的“话语权”,至少可以让他国相信,中国的做法是符合双方利益的。要建设有效的话语权,就须要改变具有浓厚“说教”色彩的话语,多从具有“普世价值”的工具箱中寻找话语。当然,这里所说的“普世价值”并非是西方的价值,也包括中国本身所具有的“普世价值”,例如开放、和谐、包容、平等。

其次,在“走出去”战略的操作层面,中国必须提高操作者的专业主义精神,多采用符合现存国际标准的方式,例如利用市场机制、基于法律之上的“信任”、透明的治理结构等,抛弃国内经常使用的“人际关系”、黑箱作业等政治方法。

同样重要的是中国内部各角色的整合和协调。中国对外方面很多问题,都是内部的各个角色互相恶性竞争的结果,而不是中国和其他国家竞争的结果。早些年和澳大利亚铁矿石公司的关系是这样,今天在海外各个工程的招标也是这样。中国现在很多技术并不比其他国家的差多少,但内部的恶性竞争导致了自我过度低价化。当价格低到超越经济理性时,尽管没有了外国公司的竞争,但造就了当地社会的政治问题。人们有充分的理由来质疑,为什么中国的公司出这么低的价格?他们要不怀疑中国的战略意图,要不怀疑中国和当地政府存在着具有腐败性质的交易。这反而使得中国蒙受重大损失。

再次,中国也可能必须避免对多边主义的过度迷信。多边主义不失为一种有效的外交话语和政策途径,但多边主义并不意味着对多边之内的所有国家等量齐观,而是须要对多边构架内的不同国家,实行不同的具体政策。在很多方面,要取得一种关系的突破,就须要从双边入手,推进多边之内的双边关系,不失为更有效的外交方法。

现实地说,任何大国的崛起是不容易的。较之从前的英国和美国,中国的崛起更为艰难。如果中国能够善于随时总结崛起过程中的经验教训,不仅可以减少崛起的成本,克服不必要的阻力,更有利于中国成为负责任的大国。

作者是新加坡国立大学东亚所所长(联合早报)



Source : aisixiang

Article Revisions:

Changes:

June 10, 2015 @ 03:45:24Current Revision
Content
<p>So far, China's diplomatic multilateralism has deeply changed. To make it simple, one can divide the changing process in three stages.</p> <p>So far, China's diplomatic multilateralism has deeply changed. To make it simple, one can divide the changing process in three stages.</p>
<p>The first one is the Mao era when China opposed and fought against diplomatic multilateralism, advocating, instead, bilateralism. At that time China closely guarded the concept of national sovereignity, often considering diplomatic multilateralism as a way to interfere in other states’affairs. The second stage is the aftermath of the Reform and Opening policy,when China’s approach to diplomatic multilateralism was fairly passive:according to needs, People’s Republic joined diplomatic multilateralism guided by other states.This balance of power has deeply influenced China’s foreign affairs.In this period China joined a lot of regional and international multilateral organizations. Starting from the end of 90s the country entered a new stage, actively building a multilateral diplomatic system. Being at the beginning a capital-poor country, it gradually become a country with a capital surplus, wanting to "go out" and cooperate with the other countries. The China-ASEAN free trade area is a clear example. Following its abruptly rise, in addition to the satisfaction of its safety needs, China must also undertake more responsabilities in the regional and international fields. For this reason the county must actively establish a multilateral organizations’ system. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks are two models:the first aims at fighting fear and creating economic cooperation, the second at solving the Corean peninsula question.</p> <p>The first one is the Mao era when China opposed and fought against diplomatic multilateralism, advocating, instead, bilateralism. At that time China closely guarded the concept of national sovereignity, often considering diplomatic multilateralism as a way to interfere in other states’affairs. The second stage is the aftermath of the Reform and Opening policy,when China’s approach to diplomatic multilateralism was fairly passive:according to needs, People’s Republic joined diplomatic multilateralism guided by other states.This balance of power has deeply influenced China’s foreign affairs.In this period China joined a lot of regional and international multilateral organizations. Starting from the end of 90s the country entered a new stage, actively building a multilateral diplomatic system. Being at the beginning a capital-poor country, it gradually become a country with a capital surplus, wanting to "go out" and cooperate with the other countries. The China-ASEAN free trade area is a clear example. Following its abruptly rise, in addition to the satisfaction of its safety needs, China must also undertake more responsabilities in the regional and international fields. For this reason the county must actively establish a multilateral organizations’ system. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks are two models:the first aims at fighting fear and creating economic cooperation, the second at solving the Corean peninsula question.</p>
<p>Today, China’s diplomatic multilateralism is in a new stage. With a Gross National Income (GNI) of more than 10 trillions USdollars, the country is the second biggest economic system in the world. Even if the GDP per capita is still low, China’s internal changes will have a great external influence. At the same time China speeded up the “Going Out” policy, not only in the economic field, but also in diplomacy and strategy.The People's Republic and the other BRIC countries founded the BRIC bank; following the Silk Road Strategy, China advocated and established the "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" and created Silk Road Fund. I am convinced that from now on China will establish more regional economic organizations and also greater scale, supraregional, international organizations. Despite China's key role in the process of setting up such organizations, their actions are decided by the regional and internatinal members. As a big, rising nation the People's Republic cant't avoid this trend because its sustainable development and its regional and international responsabilities are at stake.</p> <p>Today, China’s diplomatic multilateralism is in a new stage. With a Gross National Income (GNI) of more than 10 trillions USdollars, the country is the second biggest economic system in the world. Even if the GDP per capita is still low, China’s internal changes will have a great external influence. At the same time China speeded up the “Going Out” policy, not only in the economic field, but also in diplomacy and strategy.The People's Republic and the other BRIC countries founded the BRIC bank; following the Silk Road Strategy, China advocated and established the "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" and created Silk Road Fund. I am convinced that from now on China will establish more regional economic organizations and also greater scale, supraregional, international organizations. Despite China's key role in the process of setting up such organizations, their actions are decided by the regional and internatinal members. As a big, rising nation the People's Republic cant't avoid this trend because its sustainable development and its regional and international responsabilities are at stake.</p>
<p>Diplomatic multilateralism is an efficacious way for China's rise but the country must have a clear consciousness of its status in the diplomatic multilateralism frame. China has experienced diplomatic multilateralism for years so can learn a lesson from the past</p> <p>Diplomatic multilateralism is an efficacious way for China's rise but the country must have a clear consciousness of its status in the diplomatic multilateralism frame. China has experienced diplomatic multilateralism for years so can learn a lesson from the past</p>
  <p>Generally speaking, China’s multilateralism, no matter if the approach is passive or active, has some unique traits. First, China’s multilateralism neither challenged the existing order nor established a regional order accepted by other countries. Second, even if we cant’s say that the multilateral organizations set up by China are not useful, they are not as effective as one can expect. Third, for some countries, the multilateral organisations set up by china have taken some action, but they're irrelevant to the needs of these countries. </p>
  <p><strong>Why aren't the results self-evident?< /strong></p>
  <p>Why are this traits emerging? Can China learn that lesson from the past ? Let’s consider the following points.</p>
  <p>The first is the lack of an effective voice. Like the practice of internal reforms, China’s external opening has little right to speak, that is to say, China cannot always explain its own practice. In many aspects of foreign relations, particularly the most important parts, the senior leaders set the tones, and no other voices can emerge. This is due to the constraints of the Chinese system. The most notable example is China’s implementation of the ‘Silk Road’. When President Xi Jinping visited countries of Central Asia and Indonesia, he spoke about some key points of the silk road strategy. This is extremely important. But then, it seemed like all of China’s Think Tanks were articulating the importance of these key points, as if beyond them, there was nothing else to the Silk Road strategy. With this kind of argumentative policy research, it will be difficult to assert the right for China to speak for itself, as this kind of mechanical explanation and interpretation does not constitute effective policy research. In fact, this kind of explanation and interpretation will not enrich the core content of the Silk Road model, but rather lead to its vulgarisation. </p>
  <p>Second, the "campaign method" used to boost diplomacy. Chinese governement officials always adopt this method in internal as well as in foreign affairs. The best example are the Confucius Institutes. Even if Confucius Institutes are the product of a bilateral agreement, they all follow the same logic.In ten years, from 11th November 2004, when the first Confucius Institute was established in South Korea, to 11th November 2014, China founded 475 Confucius Institutes and 851 Confucius Classrooms in 126 countries all over the world. Cant's say it's not a quick development. But the "campaign method" will hardly consolidate the institution, contrariwise, it will certainly lead to a change of course. In recent years, The Institutes are facing a difficult situation, as some western universities decided to not renew Confucius Institutes and Classrooms contract. At a higher level,the present situation of the Silk Road Strategy is almost the same, the promotion strategy, in this case too, seems to be th "campaign method".</p>
  <p>Unaware of other countries' situation, impatient for results, China adopts pressing methods, i.e. the campaigns, to be accepted. A great gap exists bewtween China's desires and what other countries know about people's Republic.China believes that the above-mentioned projects are advantageous for other countries or, at least, for bilateral relations, so this one is a good desire. But the other countris absolutely dont' share this view: judging China's projects from various aspects such as diplomacy, politic, economy, national defense and safety, they often come at the conclusion that they are not beneficial for them. </p>
  <p>What is more, China doesn't have a full, real knowledge of political strategy in (multilateral) diplomacy so, often, the popularization strategy using campaigns adds fuel to flames:"good intentions, bad method".According to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, countries can be divided in three groups. In the first one we find countries that received benefits, namely countries with a leading role in asian affairs, including USA, Japan and so on. One can understand why who has received benefits doesn't like, opposes and even boycott the appearence of new benefits. The Asian Investment Bank considered as an asian bank guided by Japan and USA started a challenge, even a battle and it's easy to understand why this opposition and boycott stem from these countries. </p>
  <p>The second group is the realist group, or the opportunistic group. They're skeptical about China leading the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. They do not want to give up on this opportunity which is to their advantage, but have many doubts about it. This group includes countries influenced by the United States, such as South Korea. In economic terms, South Korea has already achieved a high level of integration with China, but strategically, it is still highly dependent on the US, and the US can easily influence South Korea's decisions. The third group consists of the supporters of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Most of them are developing or even underdeveloped countries. They're eager to develop their economies through the construction of the Silk Road. These countries are expecting a different set of policies. </p>
  <p>But because the understanding of the situation in different countries is not deep enough, we cannot analyse and determine the range of their possible reactions, and China often uses a 'one size fits all' approach, with comprehensive promotion regardless of the situation. Understandably, this process inevitably meets with strong resistance. </p>
  <p><strong>Strengthening policy knowledge</strong></p>
  <p>One more important thing is, policy makers and policy researchers do not have sufficient awareness of the distribution of political power within the countries in question, which often results in important decision-making mistakes. It is often the case that, in many countries, although the regime is not democratic but of an authoritarian nature, various types of opposition forces still exist. These different internal political forces have different and sometimes diametrically opposed attitudes and positions in regard to the big countries surrounding them, some are pro-China, some are anti-China, etc. Meanwhile, just as China, other big countries are looking to influence those countries. Through lack of sufficient policy knowledge, China often reaches many agreements with existing, pro-China forces (including trade and investment, infrastructure construction, etc), without taking into account opposition forces. Once the current leadership chooses to step down or leaves for other reasons, China has no mechanism to preserve its interests. A few years earlier, Chinese initiatives in Myanmar faced such a situation, and recently, it's faced similar challenges in Sri Lanka. </p>
  <p>Because China's multilateral diplomatic practice is still in its early stages, it's normal that more tuition fees should be paid. However, China could reduce the cost, because China's there is already huge room for improvement in China's diplomatic behaviour, and with effort, it could maximally avoid the circumstances described above. </p>
  <p>First of all, there needs to be attention paid to the establishment of a right to speak. In an era of sovereign States, each country has a strong sense of its own sovereignty, and in the absence of an effective right to speak, whether in bilateral of multilateral diplomacy, China's effort to 'go out' will be more difficult. Establishing a 'right to speak' as part of soft power, it would at least let other countries believe that China's approach is consistent with the interests of both sides. To establish an effective 'right to speak', there may need to be a shift from the use of words coloured with a strong 'preaching tone' to a vocabulary toolkit that includes more 'universal values'. Of course, the 'universal values' I mention are not just Western values, they also include 'universal values' that China embraces, such as openness, harmony, tolerance, and equality. </p>
  <p>Secondly, at the operational level of its 'going outwards' strategy, China must improve the professional spirit of its operators, and be more in line with the standard multilateral norms, such as the use of market mechanism, basing "trust" on respect for the law, and having transparent governance systems, and abandon the use of 'relationships', black boxes and political influence that the country often uses. </p>
  <p>Equally important is the coordination and integration of various elements and bodies within China itself. Many problems in China's relationship with overseas are the result of the cut-throat competition between various entities internally, rather than the competition between China and other countries. This has long been the case in relation with Australian mining companies, and is now the case for big engineering projects overseas. Many technology companies from China are now roughly equivalent to their overseas counterparts, but the internal cut-throat competition has led to excessive price-cutting. When prices are lowered below economic rationality, even in the absence of competition with overseas companies, this creates a problem for local communities. There are good reasons to ask why Chinese companies can sell at such a low price. And they suspect either China's strategic intentions, or the corruption of local governments. This has led to heavy losses for China. </p>
  <p>Once again, China might have to avoid an excessive, superstitious commitment to multilateralism. Multilateralism is an effective diplomatic and policy approach, but multilateralism does not mean that all countries within the multilateral framework are strictly on a par. For different countries within the framework, different policies must be implemented. In many aspects, in order to achieve a breakthrough in relationships, one must start bilaterally. Advancing bilateral relationships within a multilateral framework may be a more efficient model for diplomacy. </p>
<p>Generally speaking, China's multilateralism, no matter if the approach is passive or active, has some unique traits. First, China's multilateralism neither challenged the existing order nor established a regional order accepted by other countries. Second, even if we cant's say that the multilateral organizations set up by China are not useful, they are not as effective as one can expect. 第三,对相关国家来说,中国所确立的多边组织发生了一些作用,但对自己的国家的发展也并非那么相关。</p> <p>Realistically, the rise of a great country is never easy. Compared with the rise of Britain and the US in the past, the rise of China is even more difficult. If China can effectively make a summary of the lessons it learnt during its ascension, not only could this reduce the costs of its rise, and overcome unnecessary resistance, but it may better lead to China acting as a responsible great country. </p>
<p><strong>成效不彰的原因< /strong></p>  
<p>为什么会出现这些特征?可以从以往的实践中得到哪些经验教训呢?至少可以如下几个方面来看。</p>  
<p>首先是缺失有效的话语权。正如内部改革实践,中国的外部开放也少有话语权,就是说,中国总是解释不了自己的实践。很多方面的外交,尤其是比较重要的外交实践,高层领导一定调子,就不能出现其他的话语了。这是中国制度的制约所致。最显著的例子就是中国正在推行的“丝绸之路”。国家主席习近平访问中亚国家和印度尼西亚时,就丝绸之路讲了几个重点。这非常重要。但随后中国几乎所有的智库,都在论证这些要点的重要性,好像除了这些要点,丝绸之路就没有其他的了。这种论证式的政策研究,很难确立起中国自身的话语权,机械地解释和解读,并不是有效的政策研究。实际上,这种解释和解读既不能丰富丝绸之路的内核和内容,更会使得其庸俗化。</p>  
<p>其次,以运动的方式来推进外交。如同内政领域,中国的各级政府官僚,也总是喜欢用运动的方式来推进外交事业。最典型的例子就是孔子学院。孔子学院尽管是双边关系,但其背后的逻辑是一样的。从2004年11月全球第一所孔子学院在韩国成立,到2014年11月的10年时间里,中国已经在全球126个国家建立了475所孔子学院和851个孔子课程。这一发展不可说不迅速。但运动式的推进很难一个一个地加以巩固,必然会导致“回潮”。近年来,孔子学院就面临比较难堪的局面,因为一些西方大学开始不再续约办理孔子学院或者孔子课程。在很大程度上,现在正在推进的丝绸之路的情况也差不多,推进的方式给人的感觉也是运动式的。</p>  
<p>运动式的推进方式就是经常在不了解他国的情况下,急于求成,采用一些让他国感觉到压力的方式来接受中国。这里,在中国的主观愿望和他国对中国的认知之间,存在着巨大的鸿沟。中国认为,这些项目都是有利于他国的,至少是有利于双方之间交往的,因此是良好的愿望。不过,他国并不经常这样看,他们总是经常从外交、政治、经济、国防安全等方面,综合地评价中国的项目,有时候并不认为中国的项目,是有利于他们的国家利益的。</p>  
<p>再次,中国推行(多边)外交的政策知识储备远远不足,往往对运动式的推广方式推波助澜,最终造成“好心办坏事”的结局。以正在进行的“亚洲基础设施投资银行”来说,有关国家可以分为三个群体。第一个群体是既得利益者,也就是现在主导亚洲事务的国家,包括美国和日本等。可以理解,既得利益不喜欢、反对甚至抵制新的利益的出现。亚投行被视为对日本和美国所主导的亚银构成了竞争甚至挑战,来自这些国家的反对和抵制也就不难理解了。</p>  
<p>第二个群体可以说是现实主义派,或者机会主义派,他们对中国主导的亚投行抱有怀疑态度,既不想放弃这个对他们有利的机会,但又对之抱有很大的不确定性。这个群体里,也包括那些深受美国影响的国家,例如韩国。韩国在经济方面和中国的整合性已经达到了非常高的程度,但战略上高度依赖美国,美国仍然能够轻易影响韩国的决策。第三个群体便是亚投行的支持者,大多数都是发展中甚至是落后国家,他们迫切希望通过丝绸之路建设来发展本身的经济。对这些国家应当实行不同的政策。</p>  
<p>但因为对不同国家情况了解不够深入,不能有效地分析和判断它们可能的反应,中国方面往往使用“一刀切”的方式,不分情况,全面推广。不难理解,这个过程中必然会遇到强大的阻力。</p>  
<p><strong>强化政策知识储备< /strong></p>  
<p>更严重的是,决策者和政策研究者对有关国家内部的政治力量分布没有足够的认识,往往造成重要的决策失误。经常的情况是,有很多国家尽管还不是民主,政权仍然具有权威主义性质,但反对力量以不同方式存在着。这些国家内部的不同政治力量,对周边的大国又抱有不同甚至截然相反的态度和政策,例如一些亲华,一些反华。同时,正如中国,其他大国也在努力影响着这些国家。因为没有足够的政策知识储备,中国方面在没有考虑到反对力量的情况下,往往和现存的、亲华的政治力量达成诸多协议(包括投资贸易和基础设施建设等)。一旦现任领导被选下去或者因为其他情况下台时,中国就没有任何机制来保障自己的权益。几年前,中国在缅甸的项目就遇到这种情况,近来在斯里兰卡也面临类似的不确定性。</p>  
<p>因为中国的多边主义外交实践仍然处于早期阶段,交些学费也属正常。不过,中国可以少交学费,因为中国的外交行为仍然有巨大的改进空间,通过努力可以最大程度地避免上述这些情况。</p>  
<p>首先是要重视话语权的建设。在主权国家时代,各国都具有强烈的主权意识,缺乏有效的话语权,无论是双边外交还是多边外交,中国“走出去”就会困难重重。作为软力量的“话语权”,至少可以让他国相信,中国的做法是符合双方利益的。要建设有效的话语权,就须要改变具有浓厚“说教”色彩的话语,多从具有“普世价值”的工具箱中寻找话语。当然,这里所说的“普世价值”并非是西方的价值,也包括中国本身所具有的“普世价值”,例如开放、和谐、包容、平等。</p>  
<p>其次,在“走出去”战略的操作层面,中国必须提高操作者的专业主义精神,多采用符合现存国际标准的方式,例如利用市场机制、基于法律之上的“信任”、透明的治理结构等,抛弃国内经常使用的“人际关系”、黑箱作业等政治方法。</p>  
<p>同样重要的是中国内部各角色的整合和协调。中国对外方面很多问题,都是内部的各个角色互相恶性竞争的结果,而不是中国和其他国家竞争的结果。早些年和澳大利亚铁矿石公司的关系是这样,今天在海外各个工程的招标也是这样。中国现在很多技术并不比其他国家的差多少,但内部的恶性竞争导致了自我过度低价化。当价格低到超越经济理性时,尽管没有了外国公司的竞争,但造就了当地社会的政治问题。人们有充分的理由来质疑,为什么中国的公司出这么低的价格?他们要不怀疑中国的战略意图,要不怀疑中国和当地政府存在着具有腐败性质的交易。这反而使得中国蒙受重大损失。</p>  
<p>再次,中国也可能必须避免对多边主义的过度迷信。多边主义不失为一种有效的外交话语和政策途径,但多边主义并不意味着对多边之内的所有国家等量齐观,而是须要对多边构架内的不同国家,实行不同的具体政策。在很多方面,要取得一种关系的突破,就须要从双边入手,推进多边之内的双边关系,不失为更有效的外交方法。</p>  
<p>现实地说,任何大国的崛起是不容易的。较之从前的英国和美国,中国的崛起更为艰难。如果中国能够善于随时总结崛起过程中的经验教训,不仅可以减少崛起的成本,克服不必要的阻力,更有利于中国成为负责任的大国。</p>  
<p>作者是新加坡国立大学东亚所所长(联合早报)</p>  
  <p>The author is the director of the Singapore National University East Asia section. </p>

Note: Spaces may be added to comparison text to allow better line wrapping.

About julien.leyre

French-Australian writer, educator, sinophile. Any question? Contact julien@marcopoloproject.org